NOW ServiceNow Inc.
Dive Nov 5, 2026. Price at dive $108.75. Looks cheap Price at the dive was below our base value.
Researched Cases
- Bear
- $163.79
- Base
- $182.38
- Bull
- $202.40
The base case is the forecast believed most likely, one path. Bear and bull are the same path with the top three swing factors each moved by a researched step, all three in the same direction. Everything else is identical across cases.
Key Assumptions, Stated
- Discount rate (WACC)
8.36% - Terminal growth
3.0% - Shares
1.043B diluted - Balance sheet
Net debt $0.563B
Identical in all three cases. Built from SEC filings. Equity risk premium: 3.70% (Damodaran, Oct 8, 2026).
Swing Factors
The three swing factors (KPIs: the few numbers the value hinges on) behind the cases. Each row shows the researched base path and the bear and bull flexes.
| Swing Factor | Base Path | Bear Flex | Bull Flex | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue growth | 18.5% in 2027 fading to 6.0% by 2036 (2028 17.5%, 2029 16.5%, 2030 15.0%, 2031 13.5%, 2032 12.0%, 2033 10.5%, 2034 9.0%, 2035 7.5%) | 5% lower each year than base (x0.95): 17.58% in 2027 fading to 5.70% by 2036 | 5% higher each year than base (x1.05): 19.43% in 2027 fading to 6.30% by 2036 | ServiceNow is a growth compounder: subscription revenue is 97% of revenue, cRPO/RPO convert directly into next year's revenue, and the entire post-earnings debate (Q4 cRPO guide 18.5% vs ~20% consensus, organic cRPO slowing 19% to 18%) is about this path. It is the largest single driver of the DCF. |
| FCF margin, operating cash flow minus capex, as % of revenue | 36.0% in 2027 rising to 38.0% by 2036 (36.0%, 36.0%, 36.5%, 37.0%, 37.0%, 37.5%, 37.5%, 38.0%, 38.0%, 38.0%) | 35.0% in 2027 rising to 37.0% by 2036, one 1-point step below base in every year (step sized to the 100bp move in the company's own FY26 FCF margin guidance) | 37.0% in 2027 rising to 39.0% by 2036, one 1-point step above base in every year | The valuation is built FCF-first, so the margin path converts the revenue path into cash. Management just raised the FY26 FCF margin target 100bp to 36% on lower capex; the historical path (30.1% FY23, 31.1% FY24, 34.5% FY25) shows both the expansion trend and how much a point is worth. |
| Capex intensity, capex as % of revenue | 3.0% of revenue in 2027 rising to 3.4% by 2036 | 3.5% of revenue in 2027 rising to 3.9% by 2036, +0.5pt vs base (small against the metric's own 6.5% to ~2.9% swing across FY25-FY26E) | 2.5% of revenue in 2027 rising to 2.9% by 2036, -0.5pt vs base | Capex is the swing inside FCF: it fell from 6.5% of revenue in FY25 to ~2.9% in FY26E as management cut data-center spend, and that cut is what funded the FCF margin raise. An AI/security build-out reversal (Armis/Veza integration, on-prem federal demand) is the plausible adverse path. |
Run Your Own Version
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See the research
Summary
Base case $182.38 rests on three findings: (1) the Q3 2026 print beat ServiceNow's own guidance on every headline line (subscription revenue +20.5% cc, cRPO +21% cc, non-GAAP operating margin 32.5%) and full-year subscription guidance was RAISED to $15.785B at the midpoint with the FCF margin target raised to 36%, the -26.95% drop on Oct 29 was triggered by the Q4 cRPO guide of 18.5% cc vs ~19.5-20% consensus and a $0.02 adjusted EPS miss, not by a guidance cut; (2) roughly 75bp of the Q4 cRPO step-down is accounting/timing the company itemized (early renewals pulling ~half the Q3 cRPO beat forward, +strong federal on-prem mix -25bp, T4C backlog exclusion -50bp), and those dollars still land in revenue, U.S. federal deals over $1M grew >30% YoY, so 'federal softness' is not supported by the numbers; organic cRPO did slow (18% ex-M&A in Q3 vs 19% in Q2) and Morgan Stanley cut 2027 subscription growth to 18.0%, which is the genuine deceleration the base path prices; (3) on verified CAPM inputs (WACC 8.36%) the post-drop price of $108.75 implies an 11.48% discount rate on the researched path, about 3.1 points above the researched rate, so the price is cheap IF cRPO growth stabilizes near the guided 18.5%, the 36% FCF margin holds, and no further guidance cuts follow. The base DCF is built on owner free cash flow (filed FCF minus stock-based compensation, ~15% of revenue), because $2.225B of buybacks in 9M 2026 only held the diluted count flat, counting filed FCF and a flat share count at once would double-count. Evidence that would change the call: a Q4 print (due Jan 2027) showing cRPO growth below the 18.5% guide, a cut to the 2027 subscription outlook below ~18%, FCF margin guidance below 36%, or SBC re-accelerating above ~15% of revenue.
Assumptions, Stated
| Input | Researched Value | Decision | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Risk-free rate (FRED DGS10) | 4.95% | kept, verified against two renderings of the FRED DGS10 series. | Tool value confirmed independently: DGS10 printed 4.95% on Nov 3, 2026 and 4.91% on Nov 2, 2026 (FRED series via Equibles/Higgins). No adjustment. https://equibles.com/economicdata/dgs10 Source |
| Equity risk premium (Damodaran implied ERP) | 3.70%, Damodaran's current headline implied ERP, Oct 8, 2026 | kept, the fallback and the current published headline are the same number (3.70%); the stale 4.20% variant was explicitly not used. | Damodaran's Oct 8, 2026 computation: expected return on stocks 8.99% less the then 10-year Treasury 5.29% = 3.70% implied ERP on the trailing-12-month cash-flow basis, the first sub-4% reading of 2026. The tool's labeled fallback EQUALS this current headline figure, so it is not stale and it stands. The genuinely stale figure in circulation is the 4.20% start-of-2026 adjusted-payout variant; it is rejected, a labeled fallback never outranks the verified current headline. https://fourweekmba.com/ai-damodaran-ai-capex-is-distorting-earnings-and-cash-flows/ Source |
| Beta (multi-vendor) | 1.00 (median of vendors) | adjusted, 0.99 to 1.00 on multi-vendor evidence; effect on WACC is ~0.04pt, immaterial but better sourced. | StockAnalysis 0.99 (5Y monthly), Finnhub 0.996, Zacks 1.00, MarketBeat 1.00, AAII 0.99, dispersion of only ~0.01, unusually tight. The tool's single-source 0.99 is representative; the researched median 1.00 is used. https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/now/statistics/ Source |
| Cost of debt (observed issuance) | 5.40% pre-tax (observed May 2026 senior notes) | replaced, observed recent-issue rate preferred over the coverage-based synthetic fallback, per the dive rules. | ServiceNow issued $4.0B of senior unsecured notes on May 14, 2026 to refinance the Armis term loan: $750M 4.250% due 2028, $600M 4.700% due 2031, $650M 5.050% due 2033, $1,250M 5.400% due 2036, $750M 6.300% due 2056 (prospectus supplement, SEC filing). Weighted coupon 5.19%; current mid-tenor yields ~5.4-5.5% (2031 notes YTM 5.53%). The 5.40% 2036 coupon is the observed ~10-year marginal rate and replaces the synthetic formula. After tax at 25%: 4.05%. https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001373715/50bc73e7-61df-4b3b-9b5a-321d67b6e75e.pdf Source |
| Discount rate (WACC) | 8.36% | adjusted, rebuilt from the researched beta and observed cost of debt; lands within 0.02pt of the tool. | Cost of equity 4.95% + 1.00 x 3.70% = 8.65%; after-tax cost of debt 5.40% x (1-25%) = 4.05%; market weights 93.8% equity ($112.9B) / 6.2% debt ($7.524B), as in the tool payload. 0.938 x 8.65 + 0.062 x 4.05 = 8.36%. Essentially unchanged from the tool, the discount-rate debate in this stock is about the ~11.5% the market is applying, not about CAPM inputs. |
| Revenue / FCF path (post-earnings drop analysis) | Revenue +18.5% (2027) fading to +6.0% (2036) from FY26E total revenue $16.23B; FY26 anchored to guidance | replaced, guidance-anchored revenue path built from the release, the call, and post-print consensus revisions; the tool's conversion-bridge path is rejected as a double-count. | THE DROP: NOW closed at $150.13 on Oct 28, 2026 and fell 26.95% on Oct 29 to close at $109.67, its largest single-day decline since the 2012 IPO (about -18% in extended trading the night before; -$31B of market value in pre-market alone). THE QUARTER vs CONSENSUS AND GUIDANCE (release, Oct 28): subscription revenue $3.988B, +21% YoY / +20.5% cc, 50bp ABOVE the high end of company guidance; total revenue $4.106B, +20.5%, vs ~$4.09-4.095B consensus (a small beat); cRPO $13.65B, +20.5% / +21% cc, 100bp above guidance; RPO $29.7B +22%; non-GAAP operating margin 32.5%, 150bp above guidance; Q3 non-GAAP FCF $822M (20% margin, seasonally low quarter); adjusted EPS $1.00 vs $1.02 consensus, the one clear miss. GUIDANCE: full-year subscription revenue RAISED to $15.78-15.79B (midpoint +$15M to $15.785B, +21% cc) and the FCF margin target RAISED 100bp to 36%; Q4 guided at subscription $4.245-4.255B (+21.5% cc) but cRPO growth of only 18.5% cc vs ~19.5-20% consensus. REASONS, attributed: (a) the Q4 cRPO guide is the primary trigger (Reuters via multiple reports; Morgan Stanley cut its target $180->$160 citing the 21%->18.5% step-down and cut 2027 subscription growth from 19.8% to 18.0%; at least 12 houses cut targets, Truist $180->$150, Citi $170->$157, Wells Fargo $190->$175, RBC $176->$165, Barclays to $152, UBS $150->$140 neutral); (b) the $0.02 EPS miss, partly Armis financing, interest expense rose to $81M in Q3 from $6M a year earlier as interest income fell (INDmoney/Trefis); (c) genuine organic deceleration, organic cRPO ex-M&A grew 18% in Q3 vs 19% in Q2 (Morgan Stanley), the numbers DO support slower underlying growth; (d) NOT supported: federal/public-sector softness, U.S. federal deals >$1M grew >30% YoY and public-sector strength is what creates the on-prem mix headwind; (e) management's itemized offsets are also in the numbers: early renewals supplied ~half the Q3 cRPO beat and were pulled out of Q4, on-prem mix costs Q4 cRPO 25bp, and T4C clauses exclude ~50bp of backlog growth from cRPO, all three still recognize as revenue (call transcript). Base path therefore uses ~18.5% for 2027 (the ~18% guided/consensus level plus partial roll-off of the FDE drag) fading steadily, NOT the tool's 32.2% EPS-CAGR bridge, which double-counts growth through a 2.22x conversion ratio. Sources: https://investor.servicenow.com/news/news-details/2026/ServiceNow-Reports-Third-Quarter-2026-Financial-Results/default.aspx ; https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2026/10/29/servicenow-now-q3-2026-earnings-call-transcript/ ; https://longbridge.com/en/news/303523166 Source |
| Margins (GAAP vs non-GAAP and FCF margin) | FCF margin 36.0% (2027) rising to 38.0% (2036); GAAP margins treated as deal-distorted, not run-rate | adjusted, margin path anchored to the raised 36% guidance and the filed history, not the tool's backward 3-yr average. | Q3 2026 GAAP gross margin fell to 70.5% (subscription 73.5%) from 77.3% a year earlier and GAAP operating margin to 9.5% from 16.8%, while non-GAAP figures were 77.5% and 32.5%, the gap is acquired-intangible amortization (D&A $390M in Q3 vs $194M a year earlier) plus SBC, both non-cash. Filed FCF margin history: 30.1% FY23, 31.1% FY24, 34.5% FY25, and management raised the FY26 target to 36% citing lower capex (Q3 capex $91M vs $235M). Base holds 36% then expands slowly to 38%, scale gains partly offset by lower-margin security/on-prem mix and FDE hiring. https://investor.servicenow.com/news/news-details/2026/ServiceNow-Reports-Third-Quarter-2026-Financial-Results/default.aspx Source |
| Stock-based compensation treatment | SBC deducted from FCF (owner FCF): ~15.2% of revenue in 2026 fading to 10.0% by 2036 | replaced, owner-FCF basis for the headline; filed-FCF value disclosed in sensitivitySpan. | SBC was $1.955B in FY25 and $1.829B in the first nine months of 2026 alone ($630M in Q3), roughly 15% of revenue, and $2.225B of buybacks over the same nine months only held diluted shares flat (1.043B vs 1.048B a year earlier). SBC is therefore a real, recurring owner cost: either it dilutes or buyback cash pays for it. Counting filed FCF in full AND a flat share count double-counts it, so the headline DCF deducts SBC from FCF and holds shares flat; the no-deduction variant ($254.74) is reported in the sensitivity span. This is an accuracy correction, not conservatism: the fade to 10% already credits management with improving SBC discipline. Source: Q3 2026 release cash-flow statement and SBC footnote. https://investor.servicenow.com/news/news-details/2026/ServiceNow-Reports-Third-Quarter-2026-Financial-Results/default.aspx Source |
| One-time items in trailing results | $367M unrealized gains on strategic investments (9M 2026), excluded from run-rate | kept, tool's exclusion confirmed and identified by name; treatment unchanged. | The tool's $332M TTM flag is identified in the filed statements: nine-month other income of $357M is driven by $367M of unrealized gains on strategic investments (Q3 release, cash-flow statement). These are mark-to-market gains on private equity stakes (balance now $2.050B), not operating cash generation, correctly excluded from run-rate earnings/FCF, and the underlying stakes are NOT counted as cash in the EV bridge. The other large non-recurring economics are deal-related: goodwill rose $3.578B->$10.012B and intangibles $1.121B->$3.594B on Moveworks (closed Dec 2025, $2.85B), Veza (Mar 2, 2026, ~$1.2B) and Armis (Apr 20, 2026, ~$7.75B cash); the resulting amortization is non-cash and already handled in the margin/SBC treatment. https://investor.servicenow.com/news/news-details/2026/ServiceNow-Reports-Third-Quarter-2026-Financial-Results/default.aspx Source |
| Share count & buyback trend | 1.043B diluted (Q3 2026 weighted average) | kept, latest-quarter diluted count verified in the release's own statements. | Q3 2026 release statements: weighted-average diluted shares 1,043M in Q3 (1,039M nine-month), basic 1,035M, cover/basic count 1,038M, all split-adjusted for the 5-for-1 split effective Dec 17, 2025. Buyback trend: $2.225B repurchased in 9M 2026 (none in Q3 itself) against $233M of employee-plan issuance, under the $5B authorization approved Jan 2026 (including a planned $2B accelerated repurchase); the count is essentially flat year over year because buybacks are absorbing SBC issuance, which is why the DCF holds shares flat and deducts SBC instead. https://investor.servicenow.com/news/news-details/2026/ServiceNow-Reports-Third-Quarter-2026-Financial-Results/default.aspx Source |
| Net debt & balance-sheet bridge | Net debt $0.563B, confirmed from the Q3 balance sheet | kept, every component verified line-by-line against the filed balance sheet. | Sep 30, 2026 balance sheet (release): cash $2,393M + current marketable securities $2,214M + long-term marketable securities $2,354M = $6,961M; short-term debt $2,086M (commercial paper drawn for Armis, refinanced in part by the May notes) + long-term debt $5,438M = $7,524M; net debt $563M. Total debt rose from $1,491M at Dec 31, 2025, the Armis/Veza funding, and a press figure of '$8.41B total debt' (Trefis) appears to add leases/other items; the filed debt-only figure is $7.524B and agrees with the Nasdaq vendor total in the tool payload. Operating lease liabilities of $891M ($118M current + $773M non-current) are EXCLUDED from net debt because lease payments already run through operating cash flow, including them would double-count. Strategic investments of $2,050M are excluded from liquid assets (illiquid stakes). ServiceNow is a software platform, not a content company: there are no content liabilities to capitalize. https://investor.servicenow.com/news/news-details/2026/ServiceNow-Reports-Third-Quarter-2026-Financial-Results/default.aspx Source |
| Terminal growth | 3.0% | adjusted, 3.5% to 3.0% on the observed deceleration profile and terminal-year scale. | By 2036 the base path has revenue at ~$52.8B growing 6.0%, with cRPO growth already guided down to 18.5% and organic cRPO at 18% and decelerating, the remaining runway is large (RPO $29.7B, 680 customers >$5M ACV, AI ACV target $1.7B) but the fade must land below long-run nominal GDP (~4%). 3.0% is the expected landing rate for a maturing platform of this scale, chosen on the evidence rather than as a caution tilt; the tool's 3.5% is shown in the sensitivity span (TG +0.5pt = $196.14). |
| World context: M&A, AI monetization, competition | Execution risk on >$11B of deals is the live question; AI monetization is real but partly reclassified out of subscription lines | adjusted, context incorporated into the growth fade and the SBC/margin paths rather than as a separate discount. | M&A: >$11B announced since 2025, Moveworks $2.85B (closed Dec 2025), Veza ~$1.2B (Mar 2026), Armis $7.75B cash (Apr 20, 2026, funded with cash + a $4B term loan refinanced into the May 2026 notes); on Oct 13, 2026 ServiceNow denied Decagon interest and restated an organic-first M&A stance after investor pushback. AI: AI ACV target raised twice in 2026, $1.0B->$1.7B; AI net new ACV +65% YoY; agentic consumption in production up >13x YTD; 19 deals >$5M net new ACV in Q3 (+135% YoY); renewal rate 98%. The monetization caveat the market is pricing: FDE/deployment-expertise bundling shifts ~25bp of Q3 and ~50bp of Q4 subscription revenue into professional services, with a ~100bp drag inside the ~18% 2027 subscription growth outlook (RBC/Morgan Stanley), AI revenue is arriving partly as services and consumption, not pure subscription. Competitive backdrop: sector-wide 'SaaS-pocalypse' AI-disruption fears hit the whole software complex in 2026 (NOW -39.5% over 52 weeks per StockAnalysis despite +20.5% revenue growth), and the stock had already de-rated on the Q4 2025 and Q2 2026 prints. https://www.mitrade.com/au/insights/news/live-news/article-8-2144850-20261008 Source |
What Would Have to Be True
For the post-drop price of $108.75 to be right on the researched base path, the market must be using a discount rate of about 11.48%, roughly 3.1 points above the researched 8.36% WACC, or, at the researched 8.36% WACC, a terminal growth rate of about -3.6% (a shrinking perpetuity) instead of +3.0%. In operating terms, the price is fairly repriced rather than cheap if Q4 cRPO growth lands below the guided 18.5% cc, if 2027 subscription growth is guided below ~18%, if the 36% FCF margin target slips, or if the >$11B acquisition spree (Armis/Veza/Moveworks) fails to convert into security-workflow revenue and keeps GAAP margins and cash taxes depressed. It is cheap if cRPO stabilizes at the guided rate, the itemized timing/accounting headwinds (early renewals, on-prem mix, T4C) roll off as management described, and margins follow the guided path.
Sensitivity Span (Detail Only)
$133.81 to $258.79. Low end is the stacked adverse variant: WACC +0.5pt (8.86%), revenue growth -2pts in every year, terminal growth -0.5pt (2.5%). High end is the stacked favorable variant: WACC -0.5pt (7.86%), growth +2pts per year, terminal growth +0.5pt (3.5%). Single-variant references inside the span: WACC +/-0.5pt alone gives $165.17-$203.19; terminal growth +/-0.5pt gives $170.97-$196.14; valuing filed FCF with NO deduction for stock-based compensation gives $254.74 (rejected for the headline, it double-counts against a flat share count); holding SBC at 15% of revenue forever instead of fading it gives $153.29. Beta dispersion across vendors (0.99-1.00) moves the answer by under $2 and does not drive either end. The span is detail only, never the headline range.
Cross-Checks (Tool Only)
Tool fast-mode cross-checks only: Graham $83.45, Multiples $49.80, DCF $385.72, blend $240.16. The tool DCF is not credible as a headline: it builds FCF by multiplying analyst EPS by a 2.22x historical FCF/net-income conversion ratio and fades a 32.2% EPS CAGR, producing a 172.8x implied P/E on its own smell test. Graham and Multiples run on GAAP EPS of $1.39, which is depressed by deal amortization and SBC, so they understate a subscription platform's cash economics. External cross-checks: post-drop consensus price target ~$154.50-$154.69 (MarketBeat/StockAnalysis, 49 analysts); Morgan Stanley's DCF-based target is $160 using an 11.9% WACC, close to the 11.48% rate the current price implies on this memo's path, which shows the Street is discounting NOW far harder than CAPM inputs imply.
Smell Tests
- Implied P/E at the base value: $182.38 / $1.39 trailing GAAP diluted EPS = 131x, ABOVE the 40x flag. The GAAP EPS denominator is heavily distorted: it carries ~$535M/yr of acquired-intangible amortization from the Moveworks/Veza/Armis deals and ~$2.5B/yr of stock-based compensation. On trailing non-GAAP EPS (~$3.90, the basis analysts publish), the base value is ~47x and the current price is ~28x, still rich, so the base case does require durable ~18% growth; it is not a deep-value number.
- Market-implied discount rate: at $108.75 the market prices the researched base cash-flow path at an 11.48% discount rate vs the researched 8.36% WACC, a 3.1-point gap, consistent with a durability/AI-disruption risk premium rather than with the quarter's reported numbers. At the pre-drop close of $150.13 the implied rate was 9.38%.
- Implied terminal growth at the current price (holding WACC at 8.36%): about -3.6%, far below the +3.0% used and the 5% cap, the price embeds a shrinking terminal business on this path.
- Terminal value is 69.5% of enterprise value in the base DCF, high but normal for a company still compounding at 6% in year 10; it is the main reason the sensitivity span is wide.
Educational only. Not financial advice.