NVDA NVIDIA Corporation

Dive Nov 17, 2026. Price at dive $155.46. Looks cheap Price at the dive was below our base value.

Share count is derived from the Q3 release's EPS arithmetic (net income divided by diluted EPS) because the Q3 10-Q had not been filed at dive time.

Researched Cases

Bear
$283.14
Base
$316.29
Bull
$352.66

The base case is the forecast believed most likely, one path. Bear and bull are the same path with the top three swing factors each moved by a researched step, all three in the same direction. Everything else is identical across cases.

Key Assumptions, Stated

Identical in all three cases. Built from SEC filings. Equity risk premium: 3.79% (Damodaran, Nov 1, 2026).

Swing Factors

The three swing factors (KPIs: the few numbers the value hinges on) behind the cases. Each row shows the researched base path and the bear and bull flexes.

Swing FactorBase PathBear FlexBull FlexWhy It Matters
Revenue growth FY28 +75%, then +45%, +32%, +24%, +18%, +14%, +11%, +8%, +6%, +4.5% Each year x0.95 vs base: FY28 +71.25%, then +42.75%, +30.4%, +22.8%, +17.1%, +13.3%, +10.45%, +7.6%, +5.7%, +4.275% Each year x1.05 vs base: FY28 +78.75%, then +47.25%, +33.6%, +25.2%, +18.9%, +14.7%, +11.55%, +8.4%, +6.3%, +4.725% The valuation is a compounding story: year-1 revenue is guided up about 75% and the 10-year path multiplies the FY27E revenue base of $423.7B more than sevenfold, so the growth path is the single largest driver of forecast free cash flow.
Operating cash flow margin 40.0% of revenue in year 1, rising to 45.0% in years 5-6, fading to 43.0% in year 10 1.0pt lower in every year than base: 39.0% in year 1 to 42.0% in year 10 (step sized from the 1pt-wide Q4 gross-margin guide of 71-72% and historical margin volatility) 1.0pt higher in every year than base: 41.0% in year 1 to 44.0% in year 10 (same 1pt evidence-sized step) Free cash flow is modeled as revenue x OCF margin minus capex; gross margin is guided down to 71-72% in Q4 on the Rubin ramp with an FY28 range of 72-73%, so how much of each revenue dollar survives as operating cash is the second swing factor.
Capex intensity - capex as % of sales 4.0% of sales in year 1, fading to 2.5% from year 5 onward 0.5pt higher in every year than base: 4.5% in year 1 to 3.0% from year 5 (step sized from the observed 2.8% FY26 level vs 3.8% Q3 FY27 spike) 0.5pt lower in every year than base: 3.5% in year 1 to 2.0% from year 5 (same 0.5pt evidence-sized step) Supply and capacity commitments jumped from $279B to $390B in one quarter and Q3 capex spiked to 3.8% of sales from 2.8% in FY26; how heavy the build-out stays directly subtracts from free cash flow every year.

Run Your Own Version

Each workspace has three sliders, one per swing factor. The sliders need JavaScript; the researched values above work without it. Move the sliders past the bear and bull marks, or type any value you believe. The researched cases stay shown above. Your value updates as you go.

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Summary

Base value $316.29 rests on three findings: (1) management RAISED its fiscal 2028 revenue growth outlook to about 75% on the Nov 17 Q3 call (Q3 revenue $115.8B beat the $108.0B guide; Q4 guided to $130.0B), so the base path starts from the company's own forecast, not a haircut of it; (2) the balance sheet is far stronger than the tool showed - at Oct 25, 2026 NVIDIA held $29.1B cash plus $24.4B marketable debt securities against about $32.4B of debt, plus a $109.7B equity investment book the tool's bridge missed entirely; (3) the trailing $32.16B of non-operating income is non-cash equity-securities gains, already subtracted inside operating cash flow, so reported free cash flow ($148.7B TTM) is clean run-rate cash. The call would change if FY28 growth guidance were cut, if gross margin fell through the guided 71-73% range instead of recovering, or if the discount-rate evidence moved (the current $155.46 price implies a 23.2% discount rate on this path, so the disagreement with the market is about risk and durability, not about next year's numbers). Educational only, no recommendation.

Assumptions, Stated

InputResearched ValueDecisionEvidence
Risk-free rate 5.15% (FRED DGS10, Nov 13, 2026) adjusted - replaced the tool print with the latest published FRED observation (5.15%, Nov 13). FRED DGS10 latest published observation is 5.15% on 2026-11-13 (Nov 12: 5.10%), updated Nov 16, 2026. The tool's 5.12% is the same series on a slightly different print date; the fresher published observation is used. Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?chart_type=line&s%5B1%5D%5Bid%5D=DGS10&s%5B1%5D%5Brange%5D=1yr Source
Equity risk premium 3.79% (Damodaran headline implied ERP, Nov 1, 2026, trailing-12-month cash-yield basis) replaced - the tool's stale labeled fallback (3.70%) is superseded by the current published headline figure (3.79%, Nov 1, 2026). ERROR FLAGGED in the tool payload: its ERP is a labeled fallback (3.70%, Oct 8 computation - expected return 8.99% less the then 5.29% Treasury). Damodaran's current headline implied ERP on the trailing-12-month cash-yield basis, verified from his page on Nov 17, is 3.79% per his Nov 1, 2026 computation (the prior month was 3.70% on the same basis). Per the fallback rule the fresher primary figure wins; a stale fallback never outranks it. The 4.20% figure in circulation is his adjusted-payout variant, not the headline trailing-cash-yield basis, and is carried only as a sensitivity ($288.11). Independent corroboration of the basis split: YX Insights' reading of his Oct 1 page lists 4.20% adjusted-payout vs 3.70% trailing-12-month cash yield for that month. Source: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/implpr.html Source
Beta 2.30 (median across vendors; dispersion about 0.15) kept - multi-vendor evidence supports the tool's 2.30 median. Vendors read Nov 17-18: managed channel 2.36, StockAnalysis 5Y beta 2.25, MarketBeat 2.21, Schwab 2.30, StockLrn 2.22, and the tool's own 5-year monthly regression cross-check 2.37. Range 2.21-2.37, dispersion about 0.15 - tight for a high-beta name; the median 2.30 is the fair central value. The stock's 36% fall from its Oct high was news-driven (leadership), not a change in systematic-risk evidence. Source: https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/nvda/statistics/?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block Source
Cost of debt 4.83% pre-tax (observed, June 2026 senior-note issue, weighted coupon) replaced - observed June 2026 issuance coupon (4.83% weighted) replaces the synthetic fallback. NVIDIA issued $25.0B of senior unsecured notes in June 2026 (prospectus supplement dated June 15, 2026, filed as a 424B5): $3.5B 4.250% due 2028, $3.5B 4.350% due 2029, $4.0B 4.500% due 2031, $3.5B 4.750% due 2033, $4.0B 4.950% due 2036, $3.0B 5.550% due 2046, $3.5B 5.625% due 2056 - principal-weighted coupon 4.83%. An observed recent issuance outranks the tool's synthetic coverage-based 5.87%. After tax at the 25% marginal rate: 3.62%. Debt is only about 0.9% of capital, so this moves WACC by about 0.02pt - the correction matters for the record, not the answer. Source: https://www.KGIbank.com.tw/zh-tw/-/media/files/kgib/foreign-bond/bd405-1.pdf Source
Discount rate (WACC) 13.78% (CoE 13.87% x 99.14% + after-tax debt 3.62% x 0.86%) adjusted - rebuilt from the researched components above. CAPM: 5.15% + 2.30 x 3.79% = 13.87% cost of equity. Weights use market equity of about $3.75T (price $155.46 x 24.1B cover shares) vs about $32.4B of debt. The researched WACC is 0.22pt above the tool's, because the fresher ERP (+0.09pt x beta) and risk-free rate outweigh the lower observed cost of debt.
Revenue / FCF path Revenue-first path: FY27E $423.7B; growth +75% (FY28, management outlook), +45%, +32%, +24%, +18%, +14%, +11%, +8%, +6%, +4.5%; FCF = revenue x OCF margin - capex replaced - the pre-print analyst EPS bridge is superseded by a guidance-anchored revenue-first path built on the Nov 17 print. Q3 FY27 (ended Oct 25, reported Nov 17): revenue $115.844B, +103% y/y and +20% q/q, vs the company's $108.0B +/-2% guide and about $109.1B consensus; Data Center $107.6B (+110%). Q4 guided to $130.0B +/-3% (14-week quarter, no China Data Center compute assumed). On the call, interim CEO Colette Kress RAISED the FY28 revenue growth outlook to about 75% from 70%, citing demand and added supply, with a $2.5T cloud backlog. Nine-month FY27 revenue was $293.681B, so FY27E = $423.7B at the Q4 guide midpoint. The tool's EPS path is pre-print (its FY27 EPS of $9.28 is already overtaken: nine-month GAAP EPS alone is about $7.57 with Q4 guided up). Analyst consensus is used as a cross-check only (pre-print targets $240-$265). No free source publishes a full analyst revenue path for NVDA (the tool's own attempt found Nasdaq's endpoint is EPS-only) - the path is therefore built from guidance and filed actuals, as the method requires. Sources: https://www.morningstar.com/news/globe-newswire/9879852/nvidia-announces-financial-results-for-third-quarter-fiscal-2027 and https://convergedigest.com/nvidia-board-rules-out-huang-return-neocloud-financing-q3-call/ Source
Margins (gross / operating cash flow) Operating cash flow margin 40.0% in year 1 rising to 45.0% mid-path, 43.0% by year 10; gross margin 74.8% Q3, guided 71-72% Q4, FY28 range 72-73% adjusted - margin path rebuilt from the guided gross-margin trajectory instead of the stale 3-year average. Q3 GAAP gross margin 74.8% (non-GAAP 74.9%); Q4 guided to 71.0-72.0% - a roughly 3pt step down on the Rubin ramp - and management confirmed an unchanged FY28 gross-margin range of 72-73% on the call, calling Q4 the bottom. TTM through Q3: revenue $361.8B, FCF $148.7B (41.1% margin), OCF margin about 43.9%. The base OCF margin starts below the TTM level (40.0%) because the guided gross-margin dip and working-capital build (inventory $39.7B, receivables $81.0B, DSO 64 days) land in year 1, then recovers as Rubin matures - that is the expected path, not a conservatism tilt. Sources: https://www.morningstar.com/news/globe-newswire/9879852/nvidia-announces-financial-results-for-third-quarter-fiscal-2027 and https://convergedigest.com/nvidia-board-rules-out-huang-return-neocloud-financing-q3-call/ Source
Capex path / intensity 4.0% of sales in year 1 fading to 2.5% (Q3 actual 3.8%; FY26 2.8%) adjusted - intensity path set from the Q3 run rate and commitment book, fading to the historical level. Q3 capex was $4.422B of purchases plus $0.054B principal payments on $115.8B of revenue (3.8%), vs 2.8% for FY26 - the Rubin ramp is pulling capex intensity up near term. Supply and capacity commitments rose from $279B at July 26 to $390B at Oct 25 (mostly multi-year memory supply), which supports keeping year-1 intensity at the Q3 level before fading toward the historical rate. Capex intensity - capex as % of sales is a swing KPI and is flexed +/-0.5pt in Bear/Bull. Source
Terminal growth 3.0% adjusted - 3.0% is the rate the year-10 scale evidence supports as actually expected. At year 10 the base path has revenue of about $3.14T - already a large share of any plausible global AI-infrastructure spend - so perpetual growth must converge toward the long-run economy. 3.0% sits above long-run inflation, reflects NVIDIA's durable platform position, and stays well under the 5% hard cap; the tool's 3.5% on a $3T+ revenue base implies the company outgrows the economy indefinitely from a much larger base. Terminal value is 44.5% of EV at 3.0%, so the choice is not carrying the answer.
One-time items Equity-securities gains (H1 FY27 $23.71B; Q3 $1.8B): excluded from run-rate earnings; reported FCF needs no adjustment adjusted - identity of the item established (equity-securities gains); excluded from earnings power, kept out of the FCF path, counted once as bridge assets. The 10-Q for the quarter ended July 26, 2026 shows gains from equity securities, net of $23,707M in the first half of FY27 (16.8% of pretax income), subtracted as a non-cash item in the cash-flow statement; Q3 added about $1.8B more (GAAP EPS $2.70 vs non-GAAP $2.68). The TTM $32.16B the tool flags is this same item across four quarters - mark-to-market gains on the investment book, not a termination fee or disposal. Treatment: (1) never grow it in any forecast - correct in the tool's normalized earnings; (2) the tool's normalized-FCF subtraction double-counts for cash purposes, because the cash-flow statement already removes these non-cash gains from OCF, so reported FCF (TTM $148.7B through Q3) is already clean; (3) the underlying stakes are real assets and are counted once, in the bridge, at carrying value. Also in FY26: an H20-related charge of about $4.5B depressed FY26 GAAP gross margin to 71.1% - a trailing one-off that makes FY26 margins a poor base. Q3 FY27 also carried a $1.8B impairment on non-marketable holdings, noted in coverage of the release. Source: https://investor.nvidia.com/files/doc_financials/2027/NVDA-2027-Q2-10Q-Final-including-exhibits.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com Source
Share count 24.18B diluted (Q3 FY27, derived from the release: net income $65.287B / GAAP diluted EPS $2.70) adjusted - updated to the latest quarter (Q3 FY27) count from the Nov 17 release. Buybacks are shrinking the count: $19.7B repurchased in Q2 and a record $22.1B in Q3 (plus $6.0B of dividends at the new $0.25 quarterly rate - the June 2026 hike from $0.01 is a policy step, not a growth rate, and the DDM is correctly not run). The board added $150B to the authorization in September; $227.3B remained at Oct 25, and the CFO commentary says the company intends to use it through FY28 - continued shrinkage is likely, but the DCF divides by the current count only, per the accuracy rules. The Q3 10-Q had not yet been filed at research time, so the count is derived from the earnings release's own EPS arithmetic and flagged as such. Source: https://www.morningstar.com/news/globe-newswire/9879852/nvidia-announces-financial-results-for-third-quarter-fiscal-2027 Source
Net debt / EV-to-equity bridge Net bridge +$130.89B added to EV (net cash on liquid assets, plus the equity investment book at carrying value) replaced - the tool's net-debt figure has the wrong sign and misses the investment book; the bridge is rebuilt from the Q3 balance sheet. Q3 balance sheet (Oct 25, 2026, from the release): cash $29.089B, marketable debt securities $24.423B, marketable equity securities $44.219B, non-marketable securities $65.528B; long-term debt $32.4B after repaying $1.0B of senior notes in the quarter (total debt about $32.37B). Liquid assets alone exceed debt by about $21.1B - NVIDIA is in a net-cash position, the opposite sign from the tool's $10.92B net debt, which arose because the pipeline excluded $49.12B of marketable securities on a stale Oct 2025 tag and read only the cash line. The equity stakes ($109.7B combined) are non-operating assets: their gains are excluded from FCF, so their carrying value belongs in the bridge (marketable equity is marked to market, though about $36.9B was under lock-up at Q2; non-marketable is at cost plus cumulative markups and took a $1.8B impairment in Q3 - the exclusion sensitivity is $311.75). NOT debt: $390B of supply commitments and $518B of total future commitments are executory purchase obligations, and $118B of guarantees (including $105B supporting an OpenAI-leased campus) are maximum contingent exposure with no payments made to date - disclosed as risks, not deducted. The pending Hugging Face acquisition (about $11.9B, agreed Sept 2026, expected to close H1 2027) will be paid from this asset pile and buys an operating asset; it is not deducted from the bridge. NVDA is not a content company, so no content liabilities apply. Sources: https://www.morningstar.com/news/globe-newswire/9879852/nvidia-announces-financial-results-for-third-quarter-fiscal-2027 and https://investor.nvidia.com/files/doc_financials/2027/NVDA-2027-Q2-10Q-Final-including-exhibits.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com Source
World context - leadership, competition, commitments Leadership transition is a governance event, not (yet) an operating one; demand evidence strengthened at the print; financing/commitment exposure is the real new risk adjusted - no operating assumption is cut for the leadership change (the print and guidance went the other way); the risk is carried in the discount-rate discussion and the what-would-have-to-be-true line instead of being double-counted in the cash flows. Co-founder Jensen Huang resigned as CEO on Nov 12, 2026 after disclosure of personal behavior inconsistent with the company's code of conduct; CFO Colette Kress is interim CEO. On Nov 17 the board, through chair Harvey Jones, said it does not intend to reinstate Huang (Reuters), ending the return speculation that had drawn public backing from Musk and Trump; Huang retains a route to nominate up to two directors. The stock fell about 36% from its Oct 6 high of $243.37 to the Nov 17 close of $155.46 (52-week low $148.80 on Nov 12) on this news flow, while the business printed a beat-and-raise. Operating context: Data Center is 93% of revenue ($107.6B of $115.8B), hyperscalers about 56% of Data Center, frontier labs about 15% of Data Center revenue this year per Kress; customer concentration and hyperscalers' own silicon remain the structural competitive risks. NVIDIA is also financing its own demand: $32B+ of neocloud commitments through 2032, $118B of guarantee exposure, and stakes in the customers it sells to (OpenAI up to $30B, Anthropic up to $10B) - circularity the market is pricing even though no guarantee payments have been made. An XTB market note after the print also reported an SEC investigation had emerged; that report is single-source and unverified, and no assumption in this memo is built on it. Sources: https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/nvidia-board-says-it-does-not-intend-reinstate-jensen-huang-ceo-2026-11-17/ and https://convergedigest.com/nvidia-board-rules-out-huang-return-neocloud-financing-q3-call/ Source

What Would Have to Be True

For the Nov 17 close of $155.46 to be right on the base cash-flow path, the market must be discounting NVIDIA at about 23.2% - roughly 9.4 points above the researched 13.78% WACC - or, equivalently, terminal growth would have to be deeply negative (below -20%, not an economically meaningful reconciliation). In plain terms: the price is right only if the FY28 +75% growth outlook and the margin path largely fail to happen, or if investors permanently demand a venture-style return for leadership, guarantee and customer-financing risk that the filed numbers do not yet show.

Sensitivity Span (Detail Only)

$252.59 to $401.12. Full variant span, detail only - never the headline range. Low end ($252.59) stacks: revenue growth 2pt lower in every year, Operating cash flow margin 1pt lower, capex intensity 0.5pt higher, WACC +0.5pt (14.28%) and terminal growth 2.5%. High end ($401.12) stacks the mirror moves with WACC -0.5pt and terminal growth 3.5%. Single-variant checks: WACC +/-0.5pt gives $300.60 / $333.57; terminal growth +/-0.5pt gives $309.52 / $323.72; beta at the vendor low/high (2.21 / 2.37) gives $327.83 / $307.89; Damodaran's adjusted-payout ERP variant (4.20% instead of the 3.79% headline trailing-cash-yield basis) gives $288.11; deducting stock-based compensation from cash flow (about 2.2pt of margin) gives about $299.50; excluding the entire equity investment book from the bridge gives $311.75. Even the stacked low end sits above the $155.46 price, which is why the memo frames the gap as a discount-rate/durability disagreement. The span is detail only, never the headline range.

Cross-Checks (Tool Only)

Tool cross-checks only, from the Nov 18 fast run: tool DCF $270.32, Multiples $191.24, Graham $465.39, blend $265.64 vs price $155.46. The researched base ($316.29) sits above the tool DCF mainly because it starts from the post-print Q3 actuals and the raised FY28 +75% outlook, uses the Q3 balance sheet (net liquid assets plus the equity investment book instead of the tool's $10.92B net debt), and uses the Nov 1 ERP of 3.79% with an observed 4.83% cost of debt. Pre-print analyst targets clustered at $240-$265 (Nasdaq average $240; StockAnalysis average $265.23); several houses cut targets on Nov 16 on the leadership news, before the print.

Smell Tests

Educational only. Not financial advice.